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 1 Introduction
The Friedman rule states that optimal monetary policy in the long run requires
de￿ ation at the real rate of interest. More recent work by Khan et al (2003) uses a
richer model in which in￿ ation or de￿ ation has costs arising from price dispersion.
They ￿nd the optimal rate of in￿ ation to be higher than the Friedman rule, but
still negative. Nevertheless policymakers have chosen positive in￿ ation targets
based on other criteria.
The central result of this paper is that, if households have hyperbolic discount-
ing and there are multi-period nominal wage contracts, low positive in￿ ation rates
can be optimal. Our baseline calibration implies an optimal rate of 2:1%, and we
show that small positive rates between 1% and 4% are optimal over a wide range
of calibrations.
To understand intuitively why hyperbolic discounting has this e⁄ect, it is im-
portant to realize that in￿ ation redistributes the costs and bene￿ts of employment
through time. In particular, since a worker￿ s nominal wage is constant over the
wage contract period while the price level rises continually, the real wage falls over
this contract period. Thus the worker￿ s disutility of labour is distributed from the
present (when the real wage is relatively high and working hours corresponding
low) to the future (when the wage is low and working hours are high). Under hy-
perbolic discounting the future receives much less weight than the present. Since
the worker attaches relatively little importance to the future disutility of labour,
she is inclined to set a wage which implies a higher average level of labour over
the contract period.
The greater the in￿ ation rate, the more the disutility of labour is shifted into
the future. Thus the myopia inherent in hyperbolic discounting has a stronger
e⁄ect, and so aggregate employment rises: there is a long-run positive relation be-
tween in￿ ation and employment. This relation can provide a useful long-run role
for monetary policy. Speci￿cally, under imperfect competition and other market
imperfections (such as income taxes), the equilibrium level of output and employ-
ment is ine¢ ciently low. But by letting the money supply grow and thereby gen-
erating in￿ ation, the monetary authority can stimulate long-run macroeconomic
activity, thereby o⁄setting the imperfections. It turns out that, on this account,
1the optimal long-run in￿ ation rate becomes positive.
For a positive rate of in￿ ation to be optimal two conditions must be satis￿ed.
1. The zero-in￿ ation steady state must be ine¢ cient. In our model this arises
from two sources: imperfect competition among ￿rms and a labour income
tax. It is this ine¢ ciency which monetary policy can potentially address.
2. There exists, at least over some range of in￿ ation above zero, a positive
tradeo⁄ between in￿ ation and real macroeconomic activity, such as produc-
tion or employment. There are a number of possible theoretical justi￿ca-
tions for the existence of such a tradeo⁄, among them are downward nominal
wage rigidities; "greasing the wheels" of the labour market; the optimality
of seigniorage when only distortionary taxes are available and the zero-lower
bound on nominal interest rates. Reviews can be found in Sinclair (2003) or
Billi and Khan (2008)1. In this paper we focus on the role of discounting.
Conventional New Keynesian models take account of the ￿rst condition (through
their assumption that prices and/or wages are set under monopolistic competition),
but not the second. The fact that discounting leads to a positive trade o⁄ is well
known in the literature (Romer, 1990; Ascari, 1998; Graham and Snower, 2004,
Levin and Yun, 2007). Yet with exponential discounting, the discount rate is
close to zero and this positive tradeo⁄ is very small and only exists over a very
small range of in￿ ation. In short, macroeconomic activity is ine¢ ciently low, but
monetary policy is virtually powerless to do anything to raise it.
We show that the second condition becomes important under hyperbolic dis-
counting, whereby households have a strong preference for a payo⁄ today over a
payo⁄ tomorrow, but a much weaker preference for a payo⁄ in a year￿ s time over
a payo⁄ in a year and a day￿ s time (Laibson, 1997, Barro 1999 ).2
1There is also a literature ￿nds a zero rate of in￿ ation optimal by analysing the e⁄ects of
steady state in￿ ation on growth, for example Gomme (1993) and Amano and Moran (2008).
2Barro (1999) shows that such high short-run discount factors are compatible with observed
market returns and that there exists an "observational equivalence" between an economy with
hyperbolic discounting and one with exponential discounting. Graham and Snower (2008) show
that the presence of nominal wage contracts breaks this observational equivalence in the sense
that an econometrician estimating both the Euler equation and the long-run Phillips curve could
distinguish an economy with hyperbolic discounting from one with exponential discounting.
2The optimal rate of in￿ ation is a function of the relative strengths of the dif-
ferent channels by which in￿ ation a⁄ects real activity. In this paper, we present
a simple New Keynesian model with households who choose between consuming
goods by paying cash, which is subject to the in￿ ation tax, or credit, which incurs
a time cost. Households supply di⁄erentiated labour to ￿rms who face a produc-
tion function involving a Dixit-Stiglitz aggregate of labour types. Households set
nominal wages by means of Taylor contracts3.
In this model there are ￿ve channels (described in detail in Section 4) by which
in￿ ation a⁄ects real variables. The ￿rst two of these channels are sources of the
in￿ ation tax: (i) "the wedge of monetary ine¢ ciency" (the part of the in￿ ation tax
due to interest foregone on cash held) and (ii) "shopping time" (in￿ ation raises
the nominal interest rate and thereby induces households to substitute credit for
cash, thereby incurring a shopping time cost). These imply a negative relation
between welfare and the rate of in￿ ation. If only these two channels are present,
the Friedman rule applies and optimal monetary policy is to de￿ ate at the real
rate of interest.
In the presence of in￿ ation, nominal wage contracts imply relative price in-
stability in the form of wage dispersion. The third and fourth channels represent
the e⁄ect of this wage dispersion on ￿rms and households, respectively: (iii) "em-
ployment cycling" (in￿ ation generates ine¢ cient employment ￿ uctuations due to
￿ uctuations in households￿real wages, in the presence of staggered nominal wage
contracts) and (iv) "labour supply smoothing" (the employment ￿ uctuations make
households worse o⁄, due to rising disutility of labour). These channels imply a
negative relation between welfare and the absolute value of in￿ ation. Consider-
ing only these two channels, the optimal in￿ ation rate is zero: Thus in a model
with the ￿rst four channels the optimal in￿ ation rate will lie between zero and the
Friedman rule. This is e⁄ectively the model of Khan et al (2003).
The ￿nal channel is (v) "discounting" (a higher discount rate leads households￿
attaching less weight to the disutility from future work and, given a rising pro￿le of
labour over the wage contract, leads households to set a lower wage which means
they supply more labour). As we noted above, discounting leads to a positive
relation between in￿ ation and output and employment. However the welfare ef-
3Another possibiliy would be Calvo contracts. We discuss our choice in section 6.1.
3fects of this are theoretically ambiguous as increased output increases welfare but
increased employment reduces welfare. In this paper we show that, under our
baseline calibration, while optimal in￿ ation without discounting is ￿1:2% (corre-
sponding to Khan et al￿ s, 2003 result), if we introduce hyperbolic discounting the
optimal rate becomes 2:1%.
Our result relies crucially on the interaction of nominal wage contracts and
hyperbolic discounting. There is considerable empirical support for both of these
features of the economy. For a review of the literature on hyperbolic discounting,
see Laibson, 1997. We review the evidence for the existence of nominal wage
contracts in section 6.2 .
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3
explains the ￿ve channels by which in￿ ation a⁄ects real activity in the model.
Section 4 gives our choice of parameters. Section 5 presents our benchmark re-
sult, explains the contribution of each of the ￿ve channels and conducts sensitivity
analysis. In section 6 we discuss the our assumptions on the nature of the wage
contract, and draw some implications for monetary policy. Section 7 concludes.
The Appendix contains the solution of the household￿ s problem and further deriva-
tions are available from the corresponding author￿ s website.
2 Model
We present a simple dynamic general equilibrium model consisting of three types
of agent: households, ￿rms and a government. There is no uncertainty, and in our
results section we focus on steady states of the model.
A large number S of households supply di⁄erentiated labour to ￿rms and con-
sume goods. Households can choose whether to purchase goods with cash or with
nominal credit, which incurs a time cost. In the spirit of Taylor (1979), we group
households into N wage-setting cohorts of equal size, each of which sets a nom-
inal wage contract for N periods. Di⁄erent cohorts set wages at di⁄erent times,
uniformly staggered.
Firms use all labour types to produce a homogeneous consumption good. The
government imposes a tax on labour income, prints money and rebates the proceeds
to households as a lump sum.
42.1 Firms
The representative ￿rm uses all types of labour in a production function with a












where yt is output, nt (h) is the amount of labour hired from household h, and ￿
is the elasticity of substitution between di⁄erent labour types.
There is perfect competition in the product market. The ￿rm￿ s cost-minimization
implies a standard demand function for each household￿ s labour:
nt (h) = wt (h)
￿￿ yt (2)
where w(h) is the real value of the nominal wage set by household h. Note that
since ￿rms are perfect competitors their markup will be zero and the real wage
index constant and equal to unity.
2.2 Households





￿t:t+iu(ct+i (h);lt+i (h)) (3)
We write the discount factor between periods t and t+i in the general form ￿t:t+i
to allow di⁄erent speci￿cations.
In what follows we restrict ourselves to utility functions of the following form










bt (h) ￿ dt (h)
1 + ￿
+ (1 ￿ ￿)wt (h)nt (h) + ￿t (5)
where m is real money balances, d is credit used to buy goods, ￿ are lump-sum
transfers from government, and n is time spent working. R and ￿, the nominal
rate of interest and the in￿ ation rate respectively, we assume to be constant4.
Holdings of one-period nominal bonds, which pay a unit on redemption, are given
by b.
Households face a choice between buying goods with cash, and buying them
with nominal credit. If the proportion of goods bought with credit is ￿, the
household￿ s holdings of real money balances are given by
mt (h) = (1 ￿ ￿t (h))ct (h) (6)
and holdings of nominal consumption debt, repayable in the next period, are
dt+1 (h) = ￿t (h)ct (h) (7)
To model the split between cash and credit goods, we follow Khan et al (2003)
by assuming that buying goods with credit involves a cost in terms of "shopping
time", ns. Then if we normalize the total time endowment to unity, the house-
hold￿ s time constraint is
lt (h) + nt (h) + n
s
t (h) = 1 (8)
We follow Khan et al (2003) in interpreting the single consumption good as
a continuum of goods, and modeling the cash / credit split by assuming that if
credit is used, the purchase involves a random ￿xed time cost $ which is only
known after the consumer has chosen how much of the good to buy, but before the
decision to buy it with cash or credit. If F is the cumulative distribution function
4Since our results will relate only to steady states there is no loss of generality here







The household also faces the downward sloping demand curves for the house-
hold￿ s labour type (2) and the constraint that it can only change its wage every
N periods.
2.3 Government
Government revenue arises from a proportional tax ￿ on labour income and from
seigniorage. There is no government spending and proceeds are rebated to house-












The government follows an exogenous rule for the money supply with a constant
growth rate g and this gives steady state in￿ ation, ￿ = ￿m = g.
2.4 Aggregates
In the absence of government spending, the aggregate budget constraint is
yt = ct (11)















The real interest rate is given by
r = R ￿ ￿ (14)
which is constant in a given steady state since R and ￿ are assumed constant.
2.5 Equilibrium
A competitive equilibrium for the above economy is a sequence of plans for




￿ prices fwt (h);rg
h=1:1
t=1:1
￿ aggregate labour input fntgt=1:1
such that
1. Given prices, the allocations solve the utility maximization problem. If
preferences are time-inconsistent, the allocations are also Nash equilibria of
the game-theoretic problem of each household.
2. fwtgt=1:1 is the marginal product of aggregate labour (12).
3. Product, money and bond markets clear.
2.6 Discounting
With exponential discounting, the household￿ s discount factor is constant through
time, ￿t:t+i = ￿
i. To model hyperbolic discounting, we follow Laibson (1996, 1997)
and much of the subsequent literature, in approximating the hyperbolic discount
function by a "quasi-hyperbolic" discount function in which the discount factors
5(6) and (7) allow this to be written either in terms of money m and consumption debt
holdings d or consumption c and the credit goods split ￿
8from the perspective of the current period are 1;￿￿;￿￿
2;￿￿
3::::. The discount
factor between the ￿rst two periods is ￿￿; but that between all subsequent periods
is ￿. Thus we can think of ￿ as a short-run discount factor, and ￿ as a long-run
discount factor.
In this case the household￿ s behavior is time-inconsistent: in future periods the
household will have an incentive to change plans made in the current period. Since
the household cannot commit itself to a plan beyond the current period and since
a household with rational expectations will take this into account when making its
decisions, it is standard practice (e.g. Laibson, 1996) to formulate the household￿ s
problem as a game played by the household at time t (self t) against the household
in future periods (future selves).
2.7 Solving the household￿ s problem
We show in Appendix A that the equilibrium strategy6 of an in￿nitely-lived house-
hold with preferences (3) facing constraints (2), (5) and (8) and able to reset its
nominal wage every N periods is




t (h)g : t 6= iN (15)
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6(2), (8) and (9) show that choosing a strategy in terms of the wage and the proportion of
goods to buy with credit fw;￿g; is equivalent to choosing one in terms of the time to allocate to
employment and shopping activities fn;nsg. On this account, l￿
t (h) is not listed as an argument
of the household￿ s equilibrium strategy.
9The proportion of credit goods is de￿ned implicitly by
￿
￿



















This di⁄ers from the standard permanent income result that consumption is the
annuity value of wealth, ra(h), due to the distortionary e⁄ects of in￿ ation, equiv-
alent to a proportional tax on consumption, discussed in section 3.5. Comparing
(17) and (18) with the equivalent equations (34) and (35) in Khan et al (2003)
shows that the equilibrium strategy is of the same form as the optimal choice in a
time-consistent world.
2.8 The steady state
For the remainder of the paper we consider the properties of a symmetric steady
state in which all households consume the same amount in all periods7 and, when
they can reset their wage, choose a nominal wage to obtain the same real wage.
Households set nominal wages every N periods. Since contracts are set in stag-
gered fashion, under non-zero in￿ ation the N di⁄erent cohorts charge N di⁄erent
real wages (the highest charged by the cohort which sets its wage this period; the
lowest charged by the cohort which set its wage N ￿1 periods ago). In short, the
economy is characterized by real wage dispersion.
An important feature of this steady state is that the intertemporal distribution
of real wages across the contract period is identical to the intratemporal distribu-
tion of wages between cohorts. This can be seen from a simple example involving
N = 4 with four cohorts setting wage contracts lasting four periods. Whenever
a cohort resets its wage, it chooses a nominal wage to give a real wage w￿. In
7In the absence of redistribution, di⁄erent cohorts would have (very slightly, under the range
of in￿ ation rates we consider in the paper) di⁄erent present values of lifetime wealth because
they start time in di⁄erent periods of the wage contract. In Appendix B of the working paper
version, available on the corresponding author￿ s website, we show the start-of-time redistribution
necessary to remove this asymmetry.
10the next period, the real value of this is w￿
1+￿, and so on. Table 1a and b show the
resulting nominal and real wage distributions.
Table 1a: Nominal wage distribution in the steady state
Nominal wage of cohort...
Period Price level 1 2 3 4










3 (1 + ￿)
2 w￿ w￿ (1 + ￿) w￿ (1 + ￿)
2 w￿
1+￿
4 (1 + ￿)
3 w￿ w￿ (1 + ￿) w￿ (1 + ￿)
2 w￿ (1 + ￿)
3
Table 1b: Real wage distribution in the steady state
Real wage of cohort...























In the face of this non-smooth path of income, households exchange bonds to











where ni is the labour supplied by a typical household in the ith period of its
contract. The equation for the aggregate wage index (13) implies that when











8We show that bond market clears in Appendix B of the working paper version, available
from the corresponding author￿ s website.
11Combining (16) and (19) then using the government￿ s budget constraint (10) to









! [1 + R(1 ￿ ￿
￿)]
(21)
This sets the present value of the marginal disutility of labour with respect to the
wage (on the left-hand side) equal to the present value of the marginal utility of
the extra consumption resulting from a higher wage (on the right-hand side). Due
to consumption smoothing, the right-hand side is independent of the wage since
an increase in the wage leads to an increase in consumption from (19) and thus
a fall in its marginal utility which, with log utility, exactly o⁄sets the increase in
income resulting from the higher wage.
Given an in￿ ation rate ￿ , we can use (20) to solve for the real equivalent w￿
of the nominal reset wage. Given a level of aggregate labour, (2) then gives the
path of labour across the contract period. Exploiting the symmetry between the
intratemporal and intertemporal properties of the model, we can then calculate
consumption c from (18) and obtain the proportion of credit goods ￿ from (17)
and the allocation between labour n, shopping time ns and leisure l from (8) and
(9). We then iterate on the quantity of aggregate labour until (21) is satis￿ed.
3 Five channels by which in￿ ation a⁄ects real
activity
In our model there are ￿ve channels by which the rate of in￿ ation (equal to the
rate of money growth in the steady state) a⁄ects real activity. In this section we
describe each of these channels in turn.
9This expression is derived in Appendix B of the working paper version, available from the
corresponding author￿ s website.
123.1 Employment cycling
The real wage dispersion arising from staggered contracts means that, given the
form of the production function (1), ￿rms substitute towards the labour of rela-
tively cheap households and away from relatively expensive households. This is
ine¢ cient in the sense that for a given level of aggregate labour, the higher the de-
gree of real wage dispersion, the lower will be the level of output. Thus real wage
dispersion leads to a negative relation between the absolute value of in￿ ation and
real variables. This e⁄ect is familiar in the new Keynesian literature on optimal
monetary policy. For Woodford (2003, sect 2.1, p393) cycling between di⁄erent
types of labour is the key distortion which leads to a stabilizing role for monetary
policy.
3.2 Labour supply smoothing
With strictly concave preferences over leisure (￿ > 0), the ￿ uctuations in hours
arising from employment cycling makes households worse o⁄. In response, they
supply less labour at a given wage over the contract period. This leads to a negative
relation between the absolute value of in￿ ation and real variables.
3.3 Discounting
When choosing their wage, households compare the present value (over the contract
period) of the marginal disutility of labour (MDL) with the present value of
the marginal utility of consumption (MUC). Since the latter is constant due
to consumption smoothing and, under positive in￿ ation, the former is rising, an
increase in the discount factor means that the MDL falls by more than the MUC
so, other things being equal, the household will set a lower wage which means it
supplies more labour.
Working through the steps in detail:
1. Households set their wage so that the present value (over the contract period)
of the marginal disutility of labour with respect to the wage is equal to the
present value of the marginal utility of consumption from the labour income
generated by a wage change. This is the labour supply relation (21).
132. When in￿ ation is positive, labour supply increases over the contract period
because of employment cycling and thus the MDL increases over the con-
tract period. By contrast, the MUC remains constant through time, since
consumption is constant, given by (19).
3. Due to discounting, future marginal utilities and disutilities receive less
weight than current ones. Since the MDL increases over the contract pe-
riod whereas the MUC remains constant, an increase in discounting reduces
the present value of the MDL relative to the present value of the MUC.
In response, the household sets a lower wage that raises its labour supply,
thereby raising the present value of the MDL to bring the two present values
back into equality. So, given in￿ ation, as the discount rate increases, labour
supply increases.
4. An increase in in￿ ation means employment cycling gets stronger so the MDL
increases more over the contract period and the more the discounting e⁄ect
reduces the present value of the MDL relative to the present value of the
MUC. Consequently the household sets a wage that increases its labour
supply to bring the two present values back into equality. So, given dis-
counting, as the in￿ ation rate increases, labour supply increases.
3.4 Shopping time
As in￿ ation rises, and hence the nominal interest rate rises as well, households
optimally substitute away from cash and towards credit goods as given by (17).
This involves direct costs in terms of shopping time given by (9). The time con-
straint (8) then means less time is available for market activities so this generates
a negative relation between the level of in￿ ation and real activity.
3.5 Wedge of monetary ine¢ ciency
The in￿ ation tax raises the cost of consumption of cash goods, and we de￿ne
the wedge of monetary ine¢ ciency, following Khan et al (2003) as the di⁄erence
between the actual cost of consumption and the cost when the nominal interest rate
is zero. From inspection of (18) this wedge is equal to R(1 ￿ ￿
￿
t), the product of
14the nominal interest rate and the proportion of cash goods in consumption (1 ￿ ￿).
In other words, steady state in￿ ation acts as a proportional tax on consumption,
with the tax rate being R(1 ￿ ￿
￿
t). This generates a negative relation between
in￿ ation and real activity.
3.6 Comparison
Table 2 compares the e⁄ects of ￿ve channels on real activity10.
Table 2: Five channels linking in￿ ation and real activity
E⁄ect on real activity
of an increase in ￿
￿ > 0 ￿ < 0
Employment cycling # "
Labour supply smoothing # "
Discounting " "
Shopping time # #
Wedge of monetary ine¢ ciency # #
4 Choice of parameters
We choose a benchmark set of parameters, shown in table 3, to allow us to explore
the determinants of the optimal in￿ ation rate in our model. We perform sensitivity
analysis to all the important parameters in section 5.3 below.
10There is a close mapping between these ￿ve channels and the model of Khan et al (2003).
The key di⁄erence is that we assume sticky nominal wages, whereas Khan et al (2003) assume
sticky nominal prices. The real wage dispersion in our model corresponds to "relative price
distortion" in theirs: we prefer the term "employment cycling" since it focusses on the e⁄ect
of in￿ ation on quantities directly relevant for welfare, rather than prices. "Labour supply
smoothing" corresponds to their "markup distortion" - in our model in￿ ation, via household
preferences, e⁄ects the markup of the real wage over the marginal disutility of labour. The
discounting e⁄ect is present in their model, but is small due to their assumption of exponential
discounting (for a comparison of exponential and hyperbolic discounting see Graham and Snower,
2008).
15Table 3: Parameters
￿ ￿ r ￿ N ￿ ￿ n
1 2:3 0:04 0:7 12 5 0:35 0:2
4.1 Wage setting
We take the length of a contract to be one year, following Taylor (1999), and
assume it remains constant as in￿ ation varies. We discuss the empirical rationale
for this in section 6.2.
4.2 Period of Analysis
In our model the period of analysis is important for two reasons. Firstly, it
determines the time over which the high short-run discount factor applies and so
the strength of the discounting e⁄ect - this is discussed in the next subsection
Secondly, it a⁄ects average money balances and so the importance of the in￿ ation
tax. We choose a period of analysis of one month, and this, along with our
assumption of a contract length of one year implies that there are twelve wage
setting cohorts N = 12.
4.3 Preferences
We have already restricted household￿ s utility functions (4) to be separable in
consumption and leisure implying logarithmic preferences over consumption, and
we further choose logarithmic preferences over leisure, ￿ = 1. The weight on
leisure in the utility function, ￿, is chosen so that households spend 20% of their
time working (standard in the RBC literature).






so given our calibration of the real interest rate we only need to pick one of the
discounting parameters.
The choice of ￿, the parameter measuring the size of short-run subjective dis-
counting, is more di¢ cult. Values of between 60% and 70% are standard in the
16hyperbolic discounting literature, for example Laibson et al (2007), but applying
to annual data. There are some attempts to estimate quasi-hyperbolic discount
functions over shorter time horizons, all using the pattern of consumption between
paydays. Shapiro (2005) ￿nds a daily discount factor of around 90%; Hu⁄man
and Barenstein (2005) ￿nd a range from 87% to 97%; Mastrobuoni and Weinberg
(2009) obtain broadly similar results. Note that these studies are incompatible
with Laibson￿ s work since they imply an annual discount factor much higher than
70%. There are also a number of serious methodological issues in comparing
di⁄erent studies11.
The only survey we are aware of is Fredrick et al (2002). Their ￿ndings
on the short-run discount factor, in their table 1a, suggest that it is somewhere
between 0% and 80%. Given the lack of a consensus, we choose ￿ = 70% for
our baseline calibration. This choices implies via (22) a value for the long-run
discount parameter ￿ of 0:998. So our calibration is broadly compatible with
Laibson￿ s since our annual discount factor will be ￿￿
11 ￿ 68%.
A further choice is whether the period of analysis should be the same as the
period over which the high short-run discount factor applies. Making the period
of analysis longer than the period of high discounting would have no great e⁄ect.
Making it shorter would involve an extra parameter and would require assumptions
about how to "compound down" the short-run discount factor. In the absence
of any empirical guidance on these issues we choose to keep the period of analysis
the same as the period over which the short-run discount factor applies i.e. the
"kink" in the quasi-hyperbolic discount function is after one period.
4.4 Money demand
Demand for real balances in our model is given by mt = (1 ￿ ￿t)ct and ￿, the
proportion of credit goods, depends on the distribution of costs via (17). Since
we take our model of credit goods from Khan et al (2003), we can also use their
11One issue is that discounting would be expected to vary across groups in society. Since
the di⁄erenst studies use di⁄erent data sets, they may be measuring the discounting of di⁄erent
groups. In the current paper we describe the behaviour of wage setters who will be present
in di⁄erent data sets to di⁄erent extents. Another issue is that discounting parameters are
estimated jointly with the intertemporal elastically of consumption and also depend on other
assumptions such as the extent of credit constraints.
17estimates for the form of the cost distribution function F. They posit that F has
a generalized beta distribution






where B is the beta distribution, and then use US data to estimate the ￿ve para-
meters, ￿L;￿H;￿;b1;b2, based on two data sets, a "short sample" starting in 1959
and a "long sample" starting in 194812. For our benchmark calibration, we use
the short sample estimates and report results for the long sample estimates in our
sensitivities section.
4.5 Other parameters
For the elasticity of labour substitution, ￿, we choose a value of 5.13 We set the
level of labour taxation ￿ to be 35%, corresponding roughly to the average for the
OECD, see Mendoza et al (1994).
4.6 The zero-in￿ ation steady state
At zero in￿ ation, there are no relative price distortions since the real wage is con-
stant over the contract period. Given the above choice of parameters, households
buy 65% of goods with credit, and hence the ratio of money balances to consump-
tion is 35%. Households spend 0:003% of their time endowment shopping. This
is similar to the value in Khan et al (2003) and is consonant with the observa-
tion by Lucas (2000) that households spend "several hours per year" avoiding the
in￿ ation tax.
5 The optimal rate of in￿ ation
Optimal monetary policy in the long run involves choosing a steady state in￿ ation
rate (money growth rate) to maximize social welfare. However de￿ning social
welfare is not straightforward since with time-inconsistent preferences, di⁄erent
12Details are in Khan et al (2003) footnote 22
13Erceg et al (2000) use a value of 4; Huang and Liu (2002) use 6.
18selves will not necessarily agree on rankings of utility ￿ ows (see • Imrohoro… glu et
al., 2003). One approach is to de￿ne social welfare as a sum of the utility of all
selves at all points in time, choosing a backward discount factor to measure how
a self at some particular time values utility ￿ ows at earlier times. The choice of
a backward discount factor is complex (see • Imrohoro… glu et al., 2003 and Caplin
and Leahy, 2004) but assuming it is between 0 and 1 (i.e. utility in the past is
valued less than utility today) Appendix B.4 shows that the social welfare function,











where the constant of proportionality is a function of the backward discount factor
and the steady state rate of interest i.e. it is independent of all the parameters we
will vary.
Output and hence consumption in the zero-in￿ ation steady state are below the
￿rst best due to the presence of distorting labour taxes and imperfect competition.
This means that if there is a positive trade o⁄between real variables and in￿ ation
at least in some range from zero in￿ ation upwards, the monetary policymaker can
potentially improve social welfare by choosing higher in￿ ation.
Given our choice of parameters, the annual in￿ ation rate that maximizes social
welfare is 2:1%. In the next two sections we explain the role of the ￿ve channels
in this result, and show how it depends on our choice of parameters.
5.1 Selectively removing channels
How much do each of the ￿ve channels by which in￿ ation a⁄ects real variables
(described in section 3) contribute to our benchmark result? Table 4 reports the
e⁄ect of selectively eliminating combinations of the channels14.
14We eliminate the discount e⁄ect by setting ￿t:t+i = 1 for all t;i; labour supply smoothing
by setting ￿ = 0; the wedge by setting R(1 ￿ ￿) to zero in the labour supply equation; shopping
time by forcing ns
t = 0; employment cycling by forcing n to be constant over the contract period
at its calibrated value.






2. Discounting, shopping time ￿0:88%
3. Discounting, wedge ￿0:55%
4. Discounting, shopping time, wedge 0:0%
5. Discounting, employment cycling, labour supply smoothing ￿3:9%
Discounting is the only one of the ￿ve channels which leads to a positive relation
between in￿ ation and real activity, and eliminating it means that de￿ ation becomes
optimal. This mirrors the result of Khan et al (2003) that, in the absence of
discounting, the other channels imply that mild de￿ ation is optimal (Khan et al￿ s,
2003 equivalent optimal rate is ￿0:76%).
Shopping time and the wedge of monetary ine¢ ciency represent the e⁄ects of
the in￿ ation tax in terms of shopping time and the cost of consumption respec-
tively. Eliminating either of these therefore will raise the optimal in￿ ation rate,
and lines 2 and 3 of the table show this. If both of these e⁄ects and discounting
are eliminated, the only channels that remain are employment cycling and labour
supply smoothing. Both of these imply a negative relation between the absolute
value of in￿ ation and real variables: hence taken on their own they imply that
zero in￿ ation is optimal, line 4 of the table.
If we eliminate the e⁄ects of relative price instability by "switching o⁄" employ-
ment cycling, the only e⁄ects of in￿ ation would be shopping time and the wedge
of monetary ine¢ ciency. Setting the nominal interest rate to zero eliminates both
of these (as can be seen from inspection of (17) and (21)) so the Friedman rule is
optimal. With R = 0; the Fisher relation implies 1+￿ = (1 + r)
￿1 and given our
choice of r = 4% this means ￿ = ￿3:9%
205.2 Monetary policy and ine¢ ciency
The level of optimal in￿ ation will depend on the degree to which the steady state
is ine¢ cient. In our model the zero-in￿ ation steady state is ine¢ cient due to
imperfect competition in the labour market and the tax on labour income and we
can demonstrate the following striking result: the greater the ine¢ ciency in our
economy - so that the lower is steady-state output relative to optimal output - then
the greater is the optimal in￿ ation rate. In short, the optimal in￿ ation rate is not
independent of the degree of economic ine¢ ciency. On the contrary, the optimal
in￿ ation rate is positive because it can compensate for an ine¢ cient steady state
level of real activity.
The degree of imperfect competition is given by the parameter ￿ which repre-
sents the level of market power of a particular labour type. From (1), the higher
is ￿, the more substitutable are labour types, so the lower is market power. If we
weaken the degree of imperfect competition by raising ￿ from the baseline of 5 to a
value of 7, the optimal rate of in￿ ation falls to 1:8%. Similarly, if we increase the
degree of imperfect competition by choosing ￿ = 3, the optimal rate of in￿ ation
increases to 2:3%.
The proportional labour income tax is a rate ￿, chosen to be 35% in our baseline
calibration. Reducing the tax rate to 25%, thus making the steady state less
ine¢ cient reduces the optimal rate of in￿ ation to 1:7%. Increasing the tax rate
to 45% increases the optimal in￿ ation rate to 2:6%.
This result has wide-ranging implications and we discuss some of these in
section 6.3 below.
5.3 Sensitivity analysis
In this section we describe how variations in other model parameters a⁄ect the
optimal rate of in￿ ation. Although there is a large degree of uncertainty about
many of the parameters of our model, this section shows that our main result,
that a positive rate of in￿ ation is optimal, is robust to variations in our benchmark
calibration.
215.3.1 Discounting and period of analysis
Table 5 shows how the optimal rate of in￿ ation varies with these the short-run
discount factor and the period of analysis15. We choose short-run discount factors
ranging from 60% to 95%, and a period of analysis from semi-annual to weekly
(semi-annual contracts are the longest that are compatible with overlapping wage
contracts a year in length). Looking along the rows we see that the higher the
short-run discount factor, the greater the optimal rate of in￿ ation. In order for
optimal in￿ ation to be positive when equilibrium output is ine¢ ciently low, there
must be a positive relation between in￿ ation and real economic activity. The only
channel in our model which leads to such a positive relation is discounting. The
more heavily households discount the short-term future, the greater the positive
e⁄ect of in￿ ation on real economic activity and thus the greater is the optimal
in￿ ation rate. Note that the macroeconomic literature on hyperbolic discounting
typically uses values in the ￿rst three columns of the table.
Table 5: Sensitivity to discount factor and period of analysis
N n ￿ 0:6 0:7 0:8 0:9 0:95
52 1:4% 1:0% 0:74% 0:56% 0:47%
12 3:7% 2:1% 0:92% -0:02% ￿0:41%
4 8:8% 5:6% 2:8% ￿1:9% ￿2:8%
2 10% 6:8% 2:2:% ￿3:9% ￿3:9%
Our baseline calibration takes the period of analysis to be a month. In standard
models, the period of analysis has small e⁄ects, if any. In contrast, in our model
the period has two o⁄setting e⁄ects. Firstly, the longer the period of analysis, the
greater the real money balances that households hold, other things being equal, and
thus the greater is the e⁄ect of the in￿ ation tax and the lower is the optimal rate
of in￿ ation. Secondly, the period of analysis is also the length of time for which
the high short-run discount rate applies and tends to strengthen the discounting
e⁄ect and thus raises the optimal rate of in￿ ation. The table shows that the ￿rst
e⁄ect dominates when discounting is weak; and the second when discounting is
strong.
15When we change the short-run discount factor we also need to change the long-run discount
factor according to (22) to keep the real interest rate at its calibrated value.
225.3.2 Shopping Time
The properties of shopping time and the monetary wedge are largely determined
by the estimates of the shopping time function which we take from Khan et al
(2003). They present two sets of estimates, one based on a short sample period
and the other on a longer sample. In our base calibration we use the former.
If instead we use the latter, the optimal in￿ ation rate becomes 2:6%. Although
the optimal rate doesn￿ t change much, the relative magnitude of the e⁄ects of the
monetary wedge and shopping time changes considerably.16
5.3.3 Labour supply elasticity
As the elasticity of labour supply falls (￿ increases), households become more
averse to non-smooth paths of labour so the positive trade-o⁄between output and
in￿ ation weakens and optimal rate of in￿ ation falls. This e⁄ect is shown in table
617.
Table 6: Sensitivity to labour supply elasticity
￿ 0 1 2 5 10
6:7% 2:1% 1:4% 0:72% 0:45%
5.3.4 Summary
As discussed in section 4, there is a large degree of uncertainty over all the impor-
tant parameters of the model, both in terms of their measurement and of mapping
what is a very stylised model onto the world. However this section has shown that
our result of a positive optimal rate of in￿ ation is robust to plausible variations in
the parameters with the exception of the discount factor. This reemphasizes the
importance of discounting as the only channel which leads to a positive relation
between in￿ ation and real variables.
16In our baseline calibration, shopping time increases by 1:9% from its value at zero in￿ ation
to its value at the optimal rate, and the proportion of credit goods by 0:02%. Using the "long
sample" estimates of money demand, these values become 0:15% and 0:13% respectively.
17The table includes the limiting case ￿ = 0:This corresponds to the case of "indivisible labour"
(Hansen, 1985) in the RBC literature but the justi￿cation for this is based on a lottery among
heterogenous agents. Such a justi￿cation is not valid in our model since we would expect the
outcome of such a lottery to be di⁄erent under hyperbolic discounting.
236 Discussion
6.1 Calvo contracts
Calvo contracts are common in standard new Keynesian models which are lin-
earized around a zero in￿ ation rate. However they give anomalous results in
models with non-zero steady state in￿ ation. The problem is as follows. Calvo
contracts imply that, if there are a large number of households, some of them
never reset their nominal wage. With positive steady state in￿ ation, this means
the real wage of such households falls to zero. Given the simple CES form of ￿rms￿
production function (1), ￿rms substitute completely to these wage setters meaning
production falls towards zero. Bakshi et al (2003) address this issue more formally
and show that Calvo contracts imply a maximum rate of steady state in￿ ation that
can be analyzed - given their calibration, this maximum value is 5:5% - and that
they distort the steady state for any value of in￿ ation substantially di⁄erent from
zero.
6.2 The absence of indexation
A key assumption of our analysis are that wages are set annually in nominal terms,
and that within this contract period of one year there is no indexation. In this
assumption we follow Khan et al (2003) who specify a more complex process of
price adjustment than us but still assume that it is exogenous. In this section we
review the evidence for this.
When thinking about the nature of wage contracts it is important to distinguish
between unionized and non-unionized workers. Taylor (1999), reviewing the direct
empirical evidence for the unionized sector in the US, cites a large number of
studies that suggests that annual contracts are the most common length of wage
setting interval. The wide variation across countries is captured by Groth and
Johansson (2004) who update the study of Bruno and Sachs (1985) with data from
1985 - 1995. They assign countries an index which takes a value of 0 if the average
length of union contract is a year or less, 1 if it is from 1 - 3 years and 2 if it is
greater than 3 years. The mean of this index across OECD countries was 0.94 for
1985 - 1995, suggesting a mean contract length greater than a year.
24There is much less evidence on the non-unionized sector, partly because the
most common source of data are panel data sets (the PSID for the US, or the
BHPS for the UK) which typically collect their data annually so necessarily miss
any sub-annual wage setting. However there does seem to be a consensus in the
literature that most wages are set annually. For example, for the US, Taylor (1999)
writes, "setting nominal wages at a ￿xed level for more than several quarters and
usually for as long as a year appears to be just as prevalent for workers who are
not in unions, or do not have formal employment contracts, as for union workers
with employment contracts". Smith (2000), referring to the UK, notes that "pay
negotiation in the United Kingdom typically occur at annual intervals, and pay
awards are often made every 12 months even for workers who are not covered by
collective bargaining" and Brown et al (2004) state that the annual wage settlement
is "the principal source of pay change for most employees in Britain". This
is consonant with estimates of the degree of wage stickiness (reviewed in Taylor,
1999) using aggregate data which typically ￿nd the average length of time between
wage changes to be greater than one year.
Because we assume the length of nominal contracts is ￿xed at one year while
we vary in￿ ation, our model is subject to a version of the Lucas critique. Wouldn￿ t
agents change their wage setting behaviour as steady state in￿ ation varies? So an
important empirical question is the degree to which the contract period changes
with steady state in￿ ation. Taylor (1999) writes that the average contract period
fell to one year (our baseline value) during the great in￿ ation of the 1970s, when
average in￿ ation was well above the range we consider in this paper. Looking
across the OECD, Groth and Johansson (2004) ￿nd their index variable was 0.78
in the period 1975 - 85, still consistent with an average contract length above a
year, and rose to 0.94 in the next ten years when average in￿ ation was lower. So
this suggests that modelling nominal contracts as ￿xed at one year over a range
of in￿ ation from 0 - 10% as we do in this paper is, if anything, a conservative
assumption and we could expect contracts to be longer now that average in￿ ation
is low.
Our assumption of Taylor contracts, without intra-contract indexation, instead
of Fisher contracts, is similarly open to the Lucas critique. First note that our
model of annual nominal contracts nests annual indexation since wages are opti-
25mally reset each year. Only indexation within the annual contract period would
a⁄ect our results. The empirical evidence on indexation is striking. Card (1986),
writing about a period when average in￿ ation was well over the top of the range
we consider, notes that "perhaps no more than 10% of all US workers are covered
by cost-of-living provisions". This surprising result arises because indexation is
only observed in union contracts and, as Card (1983) reports, only in around 60%
of these, and "escalation provisions are rare in the non-union sector". Further,
while one can ￿nd evidence of quarterly cost of living (COLA) adjustments, the
vast majority seem to be annual (Kaufman and Woglom, 1986, Vroman, 1985).
More recently, Christo￿des and Leung (2003), looking at Canadian data from 1976
- 1999, write that "very few contracts contain COLA clauses". So while wage in-
dexation is a feature of very high in￿ ation rates (Marinakis, 1997), it seems largely
absent over the range of in￿ ation we consider.
6.3 Monetary policymaking
While our model is very stylized, an implication of our analysis is that the structure
of the economy - insofar as it a⁄ects the degree of economic ine¢ ciency - should
be a factor that in￿ uences policymakers￿choice of an in￿ ation target. At present,
in￿ ation targets are chosen to be around 2% largely on the grounds that such a
rate is consistent with price stability (in the sense that in￿ ation of around 2%
has little adverse impact on agents￿decisions) and it is su¢ ciently positive to
avoid the nominal rate hitting the zero-lower bound too often. However our
analysis suggests that the structure of the economy should also be taken into
account when choosing an in￿ ation target. Speci￿cally, the more ine¢ cient is
equilibrium output and employment, the higher the in￿ ation target should be.
This implies that in￿ ation targets should be re-evaluated over time as the structure
of the real economy changes. It also has obvious implications for the analysis of
optimum currency areas. Di⁄erent countries in a currency union will in general
have di⁄erent degrees of steady-state ine¢ ciency, so the mechanism in this paper
gives a new source of di⁄erential welfare e⁄ects across countries in addition to
those discussed in, for example, Benigno (2004).
We most certainly do not wish to argue that monetary policy should always
26compensate for ine¢ ciencies in labour and product markets. Usually policy makers
can deal with these ine¢ ciencies more e⁄ectively through the use of structural
and ￿scal policies, e.g. policies that promote competition in product and labour
markets, structural policies that reduce institutional rigidities, taxes and subsidies
that overcome market failures in these markets. The reason is that the latter
policies may reduce the ine¢ ciencies at lower cost than monetary policy. But for
any given level of ine¢ ciency that remains once ￿scal and structural policies are
at their optimal levels, monetary policy should not ignore the ine¢ ciencies that
remain.
7 Conclusion
We have shown that the interaction between nominal contracts and hyperbolic
discounting can lead to a tradeo⁄ between in￿ ation and macroeconomic activity
for which a small positive in￿ ation rate is optimal. In our baseline calibration,
this rate is 2:1% and remains positive for a wide range of calibrations. Our
analysis is meant to narrow the gulf between monetary theory and practice. Thus
far, monetary theory has suggested that the optimal in￿ ation rate is negative -
beginning with the Friedman rule and ranging to the more moderate, but still
negative optimal in￿ ation of Khan et al. (2003) - but central bankers have never
taken this seriously. Our analysis is a ￿rst step in reconciling the optimal in￿ ation
literature with the practice of targeting small positive in￿ ation rates.
The optimal in￿ ation rate in our model is a result of the relative magnitudes
of ￿ve channels by which in￿ ation a⁄ects real activity, and we have analyzed the
e⁄ects of these channels in our model: shopping time, the wedge of monetary
ine¢ ciency, employment cycling, labour supply smoothing and discounting.
A general implication of our analysis is that the optimal rate of in￿ ation de-
pends on the structure of the economy in two ways. Firstly via the degree of
structural ine¢ ciency. We show that as the equilibrium becomes more ine¢ cient,
due to higher labour taxes or more imperfect competition, the optimal in￿ ation
rate rises. Secondly, via the mechanisms by which in￿ ation a⁄ects real variables.
An important topic for further research would be to examine a variety of di⁄er-
ent common ine¢ ciencies and examine whether they have similar implications for
27monetary policy.
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31A Solving the household￿ s problem
Under hyperbolic discounting, the household￿ s preferences are time inconsistent so
standard dynamic programming techniques cannot be used. Instead, we model
the household at time t as playing a game against its future selves. Throughout
this appendix we are considering the problem of a single household so drop the
(h) notation for brevity.
A.1 Preliminaries
A.1.1 Utility function
Household utility (4) is de￿ned in terms of consumption ct and leisure lt. However
leisure is determined by (i) the proportion of credit goods ￿t and (ii) the wage wt
which determines the ￿rm￿ s labour demand. Use the time constraint (8) and the
expressions for labour demand (2) and shopping time (9) to write leisure in terms
of the choice variables






and use this to rewrite the utility function in terms of the choice variables (recall
that yt is exogenous to the household￿ s problem):


















It will prove helpful to de￿ne the consumption function in terms of net assets.








+ (1 ￿ ￿)wtnt + ￿t (A.3)
321. Substitute for money and credit from (6) then subtract dt+1 from both sides
using (7) to obtain
bt+1￿dt+1 = (1 + r)(bt ￿ dt)+(1 + R)[(1 ￿ ￿)wtnt + ￿t]￿(1 + R)(1 ￿ ￿t)ct￿￿tct
2. De￿ne net assets as net bonds less credit, at = bt ￿ dt
3. Assume at the start of time the household sells its lifetime income (which
consists of labour income, transfers and the initial redistribution of wealth
which is equivalent to spreading the household￿ s income equally over the







where zj is the discounted value of average contract income in the contract










4. Then assets evolve according to
at+1 = (1 + r)at ￿ (1 + R)(1 ￿ ￿t)ct ￿ ￿tct (A.6)
A.2 The household￿ s problem
Consider a game of length mN where m is an integer. Time runs from at T = 0 to
T = mN ￿1 and wages are set in periods 0;N;2N:::(m ￿ 1)N. The household￿ s
18This is necessary to ensure that in the steady state households in all cohorts have the same
lifetime wealth. For full details see Appendix B of the working paper version, available from the
corresponding author￿ s website.
33value function is
V (at;wt) = max[v (ct;wt;￿t) + ￿￿V (at+1;wt+1)];0 ￿ t ￿ T (A.7)












1. Time inconsistency means that actual utility from the perspective of the
household at time t + 1 will be di⁄erent from continuation utility since a
di⁄erent discount factor will be applied to the utility ￿ ows. This is why
standard dynamic programming techniques cannot be used.
2. Wages are set every N periods so wt is in general the wage prevailing at time
t and not necessarily a choice variable in that period.
3. We do not allow the use of credit in the ￿nal period of the game.
The optimum strategy is found by backwards induction. The problem is ￿rst
solved in the ￿nal period T, then in a general period 0 ￿ t < T.
A.3 The ￿nal period, t = T
In the ￿nal period we assume credit goods cannot be used (since the credit would
never be repaid) so ￿mN￿1 = 0 and the household simply consumes the value of




aT = ￿TaT (A.9)
where ￿T = 1
1+￿.
34A.4 Other periods 0 ￿ t < T
The ￿rst-order conditions of the maximization problem given by (A.7) with respect
















;t = nN;n 2 Z;0 ￿ n < m, (A.12)
The ￿rst equation sets the marginal utility of consumption equal to its cost of
in terms of reduced future utility. The second sets the marginal disutility of an
increase in the proportion of credit goods (in terms of higher shopping time and
hence reduced leisure) equal to the bene￿t in terms of higher future consumption.
The third sets the marginal bene￿t of setting a higher wage (in terms of increased
leisure in the current period) against the future marginal costs in terms of reduced
future consumption (Va
dat+1
dwt ) and reduced future leisure (Vw). Recall that since
wage are only set every N periods the ￿rst-order condition for the wage is only
valid for t = 0;N;2N:::
A.5 The strategy for consumption





Conjecture that the optimal strategy for consumption is of the form
ct = ￿tat (A.14)
Di⁄erentiate the asset evolution equation (A.6) to give
dat+1
dct
= ￿(1 + R(1 ￿ ￿t)) (A.15)
35Combine these with the ￿rst-order condition for consumption (A.10) to give
1
ct
= ￿￿ (1 + R(1 ￿ ￿t))Va (A.16)










The asset evolution equation (A.6) can be written
at+1 = ￿tat (A.18)
where






















































1 + R(1 ￿ ￿t)
￿￿tat
(A.26)












1 + R(1 ￿ ￿t)
(A.28)
A.6 The strategy for the proportion of credit goods























t (1 + R(1 ￿ ￿t))
￿
(A.32)
which de￿nes implicitly the choice of ￿t.
A.7 The strategy for the wage
Recall that the wage can only be chosen in periods t = 0;N;2N:::. If we are in
one of these periods the following analysis applies. Otherwise the wage is given.






















Assets in t + 1 depend on the wage chosen in this period via the initial sale of
labour income in (A.4) so
dat+1
dwt




























￿(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)
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Using the general discount factor (￿t:t = 1 ￿t:t+i = ￿￿
i for i > 0) the optimal
















’(￿ ￿ 1)(1 ￿ ￿)
(A.40)
A.8 An in￿nite horizon game







1 + R(1 ￿ ￿t)
(A.41)
In the in￿nite horizon game, if assets are neither to collapse or explode, and ruling
out oscillatory solutions, from (A.18)
￿ = 1 (A.42)
which implies from (A.19)




1 + R(1 ￿ ￿t)
(A.44)






If ￿t and wt were exogenous, (A.44) would give a unique value for ￿t then (A.39)
a unique value for wt. However in general (A.32) shows that ￿t depends on itself
both directly and via leisure. Geometrically, the left hand side of (A.32) is the 45o
line and since F is a CDF so de￿ned at every value on the interval [0;1] there will
always be at least one solution. However since there is no closed form expression
for consumption or output nothing general can be said about whether there might
be more than one solution. Given this, the only option is to check uniqueness
39numerically for each steady state (each value of in￿ ation for each calibration)
considered in the paper. This process is straightforward:
1. Take ￿ exogenous over a ￿ne grid and at each point of the grid evaluate the
right-hand side of (A.32)
2. Check it is weakly monotonic. If so, there will be a unique solution for ￿t
and hence a unique equilibrium strategy in the chosen steady state
In practice, the right-hand side is found to be monotonically decreasing in
￿t, implying a unique solution, for a far wider range of calibrations than that
considered in the paper.
40B Supplementary material
B.1 The initial wealth distribution
In the absence of redistributive tax, di⁄erent cohorts have (very slightly, under
the range of in￿ ation rates we consider in the paper) di⁄erent present values of
lifetime wealth. This is because, if there are two cohorts, one starts their life in
the ￿rst period of the contract when income is high, and the second starts in the
second period of the contract when income is low, so the present value of labour
income of the ￿rst is higher than that of the second. The di⁄erences in wealth
are small, but they make aggregation di¢ cult since they imply the optimal wage
would di⁄er between cohorts. So we consider a government that sets a pattern of
initial endowments to make the wealth of households equal.
In the steady state, each contract period is identical, so writing the real wage





[(1 ￿ ￿)wini + ￿i] (B.1)






[(1 ￿ ￿)wini + ￿i] (B.2)









[(1 ￿ ￿)wini + ￿i] (B.3)
The government redistributes wealth before the opening of the initial period to
equalize each cohort￿ s wealth at this value.
Away from the steady state, and in ￿nite games of length mN, m 2 Z+, the







41where zj is the discounted value of average income over the contract period starting






[(1 ￿ ￿)wtnt + ￿t] (B.5)
and ’ =
1￿(1+r)￿N
1￿(1+r)￿1 . This reduces to (B.3) for the steady state of an in￿nite game.
To make the steady state symmetric, households must take this redistribution into
account when optimising.
B.2 Deriving the labour supply relation



















1 + R(1 ￿ ￿t)
a0 (B.7)
then given the initial wealth distribution (B.3)
c =
r





[(1 ￿ ￿)wt (i)nt (i) + ￿t] (B.8)
Substituting for transfers from the government budget constraint
c =
1




















































To calibrate ￿ write this expression in a steady state with zero in￿ ation so
ni = n8i and n is steady state labour
! =
’





and using the de￿nition of !
￿ =
! (￿ ￿ 1)(1 ￿ ￿)
￿’
(B.15)
B.3 Checking the bond market clears
Households exchange bonds to smooth consumption in the face of non-smooth
income. In the steady state, the net supply for bonds from cohort i is given by







where consumption c￿ is constant across time and across cohorts.









43which is zero from the de￿nition of smoothed consumption (B.11).
B.4 Deriving the social welfare function
We de￿ne the social welfare function as a sum over all N selves in all N cohorts.
B.4.1 Utility from the perspective of selves at t=0
In the steady state, the only variation in instantaneous utility across households
is according to which period of the wage contract they are in. so let u(0) be the
utility of a household who set their wage in the current period, u(1) be the utility
of a household who set their wage in the previous period and u(N ￿ 1) the utility
of a household who set their wage N ￿1 periods ago. Then the lifetime utility of
a household who reset their wage in the current period is


















That of a household who reset their wage in the previous period is


















and that of a household who reset their wage N periods ago














The utility of society as a whole (from the perspective of selves at time t) is,
normalizing the number of households in each cohort to 1, then summing across















u(i) + ::: (B.22)






Using the expression for the steady state interest rate (A.45) this can be written




B.4.2 Utility from the perspective of t=1
If households "discount" past utility ￿ ows by some constant factor ￿ < 1; at t = 1
the utility of the household who reset its wage in the previous period will be


















that of the household that reset its wage two periods ago would be








































B.4.3 The social welfare function














So social welfare, the sum over all N selves in all N cohorts, reduces to a sum of
the utility of a representative household from each of the N cohorts.
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